By David Shinn
January 13, 2014 (African Arguments) — This is not a rejoinder to Hank Cohen’s piece – Time to Bring Eritrea in from the Cold – published by African Arguments on
16 December 2013. It is rather an analysis of the same issue with the
added suggestion that it will be exceedingly difficult to achieve the
laudable goals identified by Ambassador Cohen.
I agree with Cohen that it is long past time to end the stalemate
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is also time for the United States to
try again to improve relations with Eritrea. I accept there is no solid
evidence that Eritrea is continuing its support for the al-Shabaab
terrorist organization in Somalia, thus removing this argument from the
list of reasons that obstruct better relations. Finally, there is some
evidence that both the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea are more willing
to see an end to their conflict. President Isaias Afewerki’s silence
following the death in 2012 of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was also
But it is important to take into account the complicated background
that led to this conflict. The movement of Eritrean troops into
Ethiopia in May 1998 represented the culmination of a long list of
grievances on both sides of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. With the
benefit of hindsight, there were many warning signs that no one seemed
to appreciate at the time.
While the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of Meles Zenawi
and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) of Isaias Afewerki
often cooperated in their battle to remove the Derg regime from
Ethiopia, they also periodically had tactical and strategic
differences. In the post-Derg euphoria, these earlier disagreements
were usually overlooked by outsiders. More importantly, the very
systems of government established in Ethiopia and Eritrea after the fall
of the Derg were significantly different and not much appreciated in
each other’s capital. Isaias especially thought Meles’ concept of
ethnic federalism was misguided.
There was and perhaps still is a negative psychological element to
the relationship, at least for Ethiopia’s Tigrayans who live on the
other side of the Eritrean border. Many Tigrayans believed that the
more highly educated Eritreans with their experience of Italian
colonialism looked down on Tigrayans. Some Ethiopians perceived that
Eritreans saw them as fodder for filling low level positions in an
Eritrea that would become the industrial center of the region. Ethiopia
would be the source of cheap labor and Eritrea would reap the
developmental advantage. It is not important if this perception was
accurate; perception becomes reality. Ethiopia had every intention of
creating its own industrial sector, which was already in progress.
Eritrea created its own currency, the Nakfa, to replace its use of
the Ethiopian Birr. This was not a surprise and, in fact, in an
interview with an Eritrean publication in May 1997 Prime Minister Meles
said it is “necessary” that Eritrea have its own currency and issuance
of the Nakfa “will not affect the relationship of the two countries.”
But the handling of this issue did become one of many reasons for the
breakdown in trust between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Eritrea announced in
July 1997 that the Nakfa and the Birr would circulate on both sides of
the border and it would retain its stock of Birr for use as it desired.
Ethiopia saw this arrangement as unfair, announced a trade policy based
on hard currency and letters of credit, and immediately issued new Birr
so that Eritrea’s Birr holdings would be worthless.
Since the overthrow of the Derg, Ethiopia had obtained much of its
refined petroleum from an antiquated Eritrean refinery in Assab.
Eritrea asked Ethiopia to increase the share it obtained from the
refinery and demanded additional payment in hard currency. Ethiopia
balked at this arrangement and by the summer of 1997 began to import
refined petroleum products elsewhere rather than rely on the Assab
refinery. It also shifted more of its imports to Djibouti. Once
Ethiopia terminated use of the Assab refinery, the facility became
uneconomical and Eritrea closed it down. This also forced Eritrea to
import its fuel needs in hard currency and at higher cost.
There were several small border incidents preceding the May 1998
conflict that were never made a major public issue by either Ethiopia or
Eritrea. The most serious one occurred in July 1997 at Adi Murug in
the Bada area of Eritrea. Eritrea claimed publicly after the
outbreak of conflict in 1998 that two battalions of the Ethiopian army
came to Adi Murug, declared it Ethiopian territory and appointed an
Ethiopian administrative committee. Ethiopia claimed that it only
briefly entered Eritrea in hot pursuit of remnants of the Afar
opposition and then returned to Ethiopia.
Then there was the appearance of the map prepared by the Ethiopian
Central Statistical Office for the 1994 census that indicated Ethiopia
claimed areas to the west of the diagonal border (the Badme area)
separating southwest Eritrea and western Tigray between the Mereb and
Setit Rivers. The map also suggested Ethiopia claimed additional small
pieces of territory that virtually all other maps show as part of
Eritrea. In 1997, the issue returned when the regional government in
Tigray issued a similar map. Ethiopia never provided a convincing
response as to why these maps appeared.
All of these issues, including some other lesser ones, provided the
backdrop for the outbreak of conflict in 1998. Following several minor,
alleged incursions by Eritrean forces into territory administered by
Ethiopia, there was an incident in the vicinity of Badme on 6 May 1998
involving Eritrean regular forces and hardened TPLF local militia.
According to a well-informed Ethiopian account, there were eight deaths
on the Eritrean side and none on the Ethiopian side, suggesting the
likelihood of an ambush. Eritrea sent a negotiating team to Addis Ababa
to resolve the matter. That team unexpectedly returned to Asmara on 10
May and within 24 hours, Eritrea invaded the Badme region, which had
been administered by Ethiopia, with a large military force. Thus began a
conventional type war on 12 May in which an estimated 100,000 soldiers
on both sides perished in the next two years.
Time does tend to heal wounds, but both the Ethiopians and Eritreans
have long memories and it is not clear how much of this baggage they can
put aside. Much of the discussion since the outbreak of conflict in
1998 has focused on Badme, which is only symbolic of greater
differences. Ethiopians and Eritreans must conclude it is in their
mutual interest to normalize relations and then begin to solve these
political, economic, social, and geographical disputes. Ethiopia needs
to approach the problem with the understanding that it probably has to
give up control over Badme. In effect, it has already acknowledged this
possibility. Eritrea needs to be more flexible on the sequencing of
issues. It would be helpful to drop its demand that Badme be turned
over first so that negotiations on other issues can begin. Both sides
must also understand that small, mutually agreeable changes need to be
made along other sections of the disputed border.
It is important that all of the economic differences be on the table,
including future long-term access to the port of Assab by land-locked
Ethiopia. Trade, open borders, telephone links, and air travel need to
return to normal. Eritreans and Ethiopians should be able to move
across the border without difficulty and, following the laws in each
country, work there. All of this is hard and will take many months to
sort out, but Ambassador Cohen is correct that it is time to make the
As for the improvement of relations between the United States and
Eritrea, I also agree this would be a positive development. The United
States does have a small embassy in Asmara headed by a charge
d’affaires. On several occasions in recent years, Washington has
explored the possibility of improving relations with Asmara. They have
come to nothing and not just because of U.S. concerns about earlier
Eritrean support for al-Shabaab in Somalia. Even if it is now possible
to put this concern aside, it is not clear that President Isaias is
truly interested in improving relations with the United States. There
is not much point in assigning an ambassador to Asmara if he/she does
not have regular access to the senior levels of the Eritrean
government. This is not an excuse for Washington to do nothing, but it
is important to understand that the reluctance is not necessarily
confined to one side.
Whatever Washington does in the coming months, its relationship with
Addis Ababa is more important than the one with Asmara. Although the
United States might decide to try again to improve relations with
Eritrea, it will not do so at the expense of its ties with Ethiopia.
Ideally, the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea will collectively
decide the time has come to normalize/improve relations so that Eritrea
can come in from the cold.
David Shinn was the U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999.
He blogs at: http://davidshinn.blogspot.co.uk/ This article is part of
an ongoing series examining the current state of relations between
Ethiopia and Eritrea
Source: African Arguments